| KL7 Coding Unit
Crypto-variables such as rotor settings were referenced from a hard bound paper code book or 'flash' paper bound into a small booklet. The KL7's used aboard HAIDA were powered from a 120 volt 60 Hertz source. In the RCN, a complete second rotor assembly was stored in a separate box away from the machine. This assembly had the settings from the previous day and could easily be substituted in the KL7 to decode a late arriving message from the previous day. |
This was an 8 rotor off-line cipher machine code name ADONIS, and was similar
to, but more advanced than the famous German Enigma machine. It was used
for the protection of exclusive (off-line) traffic. The unit had the approximate
dimensions of a medium sized portable typewriter and was housed in an extruded
aluminum carrying case which was painted in an olive drab, khaki colour.
Navy versions, were of course, navy grey and the hinged case lid opened
from front to rear. On the front of the KL7, there was a character counter
to help keep track of the number of characters in a message and a small
lamp to illuminate the keyboard. Rotor #4, not viewable, was maintained
in a 'neutral' position.
To encrypt a plain text message, the operator would enter the message on the keyboard and the KL7 generated a gummed tape using 5 letter groups. The tape was pasted on a message pad and the resultant encoded message was submitted to the Message Centre where specific information such as Routing Indicators and Date-Time-Group was added. Finally, the complete message was passed to a radio operator or a Teletype operator for transmission. The system operated at a speed of 12 to 15 words per minute.
To decrypt, coded messages were received in 5 letter groups. These, in turn, would be entered on the KL7 keyboard, and the machine would generate a gummed tape with the plain language text on it. This was pasted on a message pad and given to the message Centre where it was typed up and duplicated for distribution within the ship and for filing. According to Walt Hutchens, an ex-USN coder, "the noise produced by the KL7 rotors advancing was one of the two most distinctive sounds that I have ever heard. The other sound was the last round and the clip being ejected from an M-1 Garand".
Components for the KL7 and its variants were manufactured in the mid 50's to the mid 60's by several United States government contracted firms and the Singer Company was a major supplier. The parts were then assembled at either the Philadelphia Army Depot or at the Bluegrass, Kentucky plant. After final assembly, the units became the property of the National Security Agency and were distributed to the various military users. All crypto machines and materials were on loan to North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries including Canada. In addition, there was also an airborne version of the KL7 which was modified at one of the US Air Force Security Service facilities in Mississippi for use in aircraft.
The KL7A was a battery powered version which had a higher degree of soundproofing to counter the problems produced by the acoustics of the machine. Batteries were not intended for portability, but for technical security reasons. Since the machine had a high TEMPEST and acoustical signature, there were concerns that it might be 'exploitable'. TEMPEST is an unclassified term that describes the vulnerability of an electronic device to having the classified components of its design intercepted and exploited. A machine that does not process classified information does not have a TEMPEST problem, only a radio frequency interference problem. Acoustical signature describes those systems which make an audible sound (sonic or subsonic or ultrasonic) which is repetitive and identifiable to certain specific functions. If these sounds are recorded from a distance, it is potentially feasible to compromise the machine.
After the Walker family spy ring was exposed in the mid 1980's, it was found that they had supplied the Soviet Union with a complete working KL7 and all keying materials. Immediately, all KL7's were withdrawn from service and returned to the COMSEC depot at Ft. Mead Maryland. This included all code books, spare parts, manuals and any other paraphernalia associated with the unit.
Another crypto system known by the code name of Orestes employed a device called the KW 7. Although not fitted on HAIDA, the KW 7 was an on-line, send/receive crypto unit installed in shore stations and aboard ships. It was used for ship to shore and for intership radioteletype communications. To send messages over a secure UHF teletype circuit, a model 28 Teletype or reader (T-D) sent the prepared message to the KW 7 which in turn keyed the TED3 UHF transmitter in the AM mode. Note, that the KW 7 was not a synchronous unit, therefore, it required a phasing signal to be sent in order to attain a lock on the received signal.
All of the crypto gear fitted on Canadian ships in the 1950's and 1960's was owned by the National Security Agency of the United States and was loaned to North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries including Canada. Also included, was keying material, key lists, certain rotors, and key cards. This material came in a variety of editions depending upon the application. Examples of these crypto packages would be named CANUSEYESONLY, CANUKUS, AUSCANUKUS, NATO, ALLIED, and so on. Some of it was CANEYESONLY and would have been generated in Canada by the Communications Security Establishment.
It is interesting to note that by 1969 standards, the life cycle of a crypto system was generally set at 20 years even if the hardware didn't wear out. The KL7 and KW7 systems were still in use in 1969, long after their life expiry cycle. When crypto equipment was deemed surplus or obsolete, it was destroyed. Ships not equipped with on-line crypto equipment were considered to have a distinct time disadvantage in ship-shore-ship and inter-ship operations. The KL7 system was "life expired' as of 1969.
Disposal Of Classified Material
Bill Janes of Perkins Quebec and Gregory McLean of Abbotsford B.C., focus on the problems associated with the disposal of classified material. "During World War II, there was no provision made on many ships for the filing of unclassified and classified messages. Sometimes the Telegraphists used their personal lockers for the storage of this material. Highly classified traffic was usually kept by the First Lieutenant or the Captain.
As radioteletype was introduced into the fleet, it created an unforeseen problem - the voluminous disposal of classified waste. When the fleet broadcast used CW, only those messages destined for a ship were copied and decoded. This system left little waste paper and it could be disposed of easily. With the introduction of RATT, two or three ply paper was used to copy the broadcast. All messages would also be re-broadcast twice during a 24 hour period. With CW, messages had to be brief and code groups or common abbreviations were the rule. Non- essential items like book corrections and NDHQ promotions were sent my mail or courier to a Message Centre at the next port of call. You guessed it - every message was eventually sent over RATT including news summaries. This resulted in voluminous amounts of paper and disposal of this classified material became an immense problem.
When a ship became a guard ship for a squadron, it meant four ply paper was mounted in the Teletype machine and on certain occasions, six ply. With this many copies, the guard ship was now impacted with the paper disposal problem. The normal routine for the destruction of classified waste on Tribals was to burn it in the boiler. This was accomplished by taking the paper through the boiler room air lock and down a vertical ladder. Actual disposal was accomplished by opening a small inspection hole on the boiler face and feeding the waste paper into the boiler, a small quantity at a time. This activity was usually done each morning at the convenience of the Stokers rather than the Sparkers. This procedure was initiated by securing permission from the Engineer and Stoker on duty or alternately from the bridge. The burning of paper sometimes produced an intolerable amount of smoke from the funnel. On occasion, the Radioman would have to assist with a boiler cleaning when the Chief Engineer thought that the classified waste helped to foul the boiler tubing.
The method most often used in the 1950's and 1960's to dispose of classified waste was to burn it in a modified forty-five gallon oil drum. Radiomen would lash the drum to a rail on the upper deck near the funnel and the burning would commence. It is not known if this method was in common use on Tribals. One must appreciate that all of this paper had to be treated with the same level of consideration as filed messages - highly confidential. It had to be kept under lock and key and under guard if exposed. Much of the paper was burned in the ship itself but the RCN shore bases installed secure incinerators to help with the disposal of vast amounts of classified waste. The radio stations and dockyards on the east and west coasts had busy furnaces as did the Communication School at Cornwallis. Occasionally, incompletely burnt messages were found in the incinerators.
When the modern communication facilities at HMCS Aldergrove British Columbia were constructed in the mid 1970's, the destruction facility was located indoors and fuelled by natural gas. It was so efficient, that the RCMP used it to destroy marijuana and other evidence which was no longer required. On ship, the waste material was usually stored in the Classified Books Officer (CBO) storage area. When this became full, Radio 2 or Radio 3 was used as a storage area. Eventually, a shredder was fitted into the Message Centre to help alleviate the disposal problem. It would shred all waste to pieces measuring 3/8 inch long and 1/16 inch wide. When these shreddings required quick disposal, they could be mixed from garbage from the galley and thrown over the lee-side when outside territorial limits. Within territorial limits, the waste was stored within the ship and burned ashore.
There were also procedures in place for emergency destruction of coding equipment and classified material. Ships were equipped with weighted bags for the disposal of books and paper. Sledge hammers were to be used on equipment. If the emergency disposal procedure was invoked, orders were to destroy as much as possible. Machines were to be smashed with the hammers. Pages were to be torn from books and paper was to be hand shredded. If time permitted, the paper was to be thrown over the side. If the ship was in deep water, then the paper waste could be allowed to go down with the ship.
Bill Moffatt (LSCV1, RCN 1950-1955) recalls crypto operations in Korea. "During my service in HMCS Iroquois in Korea in 1952, one of my main duties was decoding messages. We used three systems:
1. One-time pad. - Messages were received in groups of five numbers.
After selecting the correct starting place in the one-time pad (which was
indicated by key groups), we subtracted the numbers on the pad from the
groups in the message and got the coded message, which we then decoded
by using a code book.
2. A British crypto machine called Typex. We inserted certain code wheels
into the machine and set them at certain starting points according to key
dates, etc. from a book. Typed in the encrypted message and the plain
language message was printed out on a tape.
3. An American crypto machine called Adonis ( KL-7).
Our main difficulty with decoding messages was resolving messages that contained garbles. In doing this, we tried different combinations that could have resulted from incorrect reading of morse code, that is, we substituted similar morse code letters in the portion that came out as garbled, to see if we could determine what the original message had been and how it might have been corrupted by incorrect reception of the code. The other method of resolving garbled portions was the substitution of letters that could have been typo errors. Many of the messages were from agents in enemy territory and described the position of movements of NKA and ROC forces which had little to do with ships screening carriers or making island patrols on the west coast of Korea.
For my work on the Iroquois, I was given a Superior Efficiency Rating
and enrolled in the Officer Candidate Program. However, I didn't follow
up and left the navy after my term was up".